Secure Remote Password protocol
The Secure Remote Password protocol (SRP) is a password-authenticated key agreement protocol. Overview The SRP protocol has a number of desirable properties: it allows a user to authenticate himself to a server, it is resistant to dictionary attacks mounted by an eavesdropper, and it does not require a trusted third party. It effectively conveys a zero-knowledge password proof from the user to the server. Only one password can be guessed at per attempt in revision 6 of the protocol. One of the interesting properties of the protocol is that even if one or two of the cryptographic primitives it uses are attacked, it is still secure. The SRP protocol has been revised several times, and is currently at revision six. The SRP protocol creates a large private key shared between the two parties in a manner similar to Diffie-Hellman, then verifies to both parties that the two keys are identical and that both sides have the user's password. In cases where encrypted communications as well as authentication are required, the SRP protocol is more secure than the alternative SSH protocol and faster than using Diffie-Hellman with signed messages. It is also independent of third parties, unlike Kerberos. The SRP protocol, version 3 is described in RFC 2945. SRP version 6 is also used for strong password authentication in SSL/TLS RFC 5054 and other standards such as EAP Draft. and SAML, and is being standardized in IEEE P1363 and ISO/IEC 11770-4. Protocol The following notation is used in this description of the protocol, version 6: * q'' and ''N = 2''q'' + 1 are chosen such that both are prime (N'' is a safe prime and ''q is a Sophie Germain prime). N'' must be large enough so that computing discrete logarithms modulo ''N is infeasible. * All arithmetic is performed in the field of integers modulo N'', \mathbb{Z}_N . * ''g is a generator of the multiplicative group. * k'' is a parameter derived by both sides; for example, ''k = H''(''N, g''). * ''s is a small salt. * I'' is an identifying username. * ''p is the user's password. * H''() is a hash function; e.g., SHA-256. * ''v is the host's password verifier, v'' = ''g''x, ''x = H''(''s,p''). * ''u, a'' and ''b are random. * | denotes concatenation. All other variables are defined in terms of these. First, to establish a password p'' with Steve, Carol picks a small random salt ''s, and computes x'' = ''H(s'', ''p), v'' = ''g''x. Steve stores ''v and s'', indexed by ''I, as Carol's password verifier and salt. x'' is discarded because it is equivalent to the plaintext password ''p. This step is completed before the system is used. # Carol -> Steve: I'' | ''A, with A'' = ''g''a # Steve -> Carol: ''s | B'', with ''B = kv + g''b # Both: ''u = H''(''A, B'') # Carol: ''S''Carol = (''B - kg''x)(a + ux) # Carol: ''K''Carol = ''H(S''Carol) # Steve: ''S''Steve = (''Av''u)b # Steve: ''K''Steve = ''H(S''Steve) Now the two parties have a shared, strong session key ''K. To complete authentication, they need to prove to each other that their keys match. One possible way is as follows: # Carol -> Steve: M''1 = ''H(H''(''N) XOR H''(''g) | H''(''I) | s'' | ''A | B'' | ''K''Carol). Steve verifies ''M''1. # Steve -> Carol: ''M''2 = ''H(A'' | ''M''1 | ''K''Steve). Carol verifies ''M''2. This method requires guessing more of the shared state to be successful in impersonation than just the key. While most of the additional state is public, private information could safely be added to the inputs to the hash function, like the server private key. The two parties also employ the following safeguards: # Carol will abort if she receives ''B 0'' (mod ''N) or u'' ''0. # Steve will abort if he receives A'' ''0 (mod N''). # Carol must show her proof of ''K first. If Steve detects that Carol's proof is incorrect, he must abort without showing his own proof of K''. Implementation example in Python # An example SRP-6a authentication # based on http://srp.stanford.edu/design.html import hashlib import random def global_print(*names): x = lambda s: "0x%x"long) % s print "".join("%s = %s\n" % (name, x(globals()name)) for name in names) def H(*a): # a one-way hash function return int(hashlib.sha256(str(a)).hexdigest(), 16) % N def cryptrand(n=1024): return random.SystemRandom().getrandbits(n) % N # A large safe prime (N = 2q+1, where q is prime) # All arithmetic is done modulo N # (generated using "openssl dhparam -text 1024") N = '''00:c0:37:c3:75:88:b4:32:98:87:e6:1c:2d:a3:32: 4b:1b:a4:b8:1a:63:f9:74:8f:ed:2d:8a:41:0c:2f: c2:1b:12:32:f0:d3:bf:a0:24:27:6c:fd:88:44:81: 97:aa:e4:86:a6:3b:fc:a7:b8:bf:77:54:df:b3:27: c7:20:1f:6f:d1:7f:d7:fd:74:15:8b:d3:1c:e7:72: c9:f5:f8:ab:58:45:48:a9:9a:75:9b:5a:2c:05:32: 16:2b:7b:62:18:e8:f1:42:bc:e2:c3:0d:77:84:68: 9a:48:3e:09:5e:70:16:18:43:79:13:a8:c3:9c:3d: d0:d4:ca:3c:50:0b:88:5f:e3' N = int(''.join(N.split()).replace(':', ''), 16) g = 2 # A generator modulo N k = H(N, g) # Multiplier parameter (k=3 in legacy SRP-6) print "#. H, N, g, and k are known beforehand to both client and server:" global_print("H", "N", "g", "k") print "0. server stores (I, s, v) in its password database" # the server must first generate the password verifier I = "person" # Username p = "password1234" # Password s = cryptrand(64) # Salt for the user x = H(s, p) # Private key v = pow(g, x, N) # Password verifier global_print("I", "p", "s", "x", "v") print "1. client sends username I and public ephemeral value A to the server" a = cryptrand() A = pow(g, a, N) global_print("a", "A") # client->server (I, A) print "2. server sends user's salt s and public ephemeral value B to to cient" b = cryptrand() B = (k * v + pow(g, b, N)) % N global_print("b", "B") # server->client (s, B) print "3. client and server calculate the random scrambling parameter" u = H(A, B) # Random scrambling parameter global_print("u") print "4. client computes session key" x = H(s, p) S_c = pow(B - k * pow(g, x, N), a + u * x, N) K_c = H(S_c) global_print("S_c", "K_c") print "5. server computes session key" S_s = pow(A * pow(v, u, N), b, N) K_s = H(S_c) global_print("S_s", "K_s") print "6. client sends proof of session key to server" M_c = H(H(N) ^ H(g), H(I), s, A, B, K_s) global_print("M_c") # client->server (M_c) ; server verifies M_c print "7. server sends proof of session key to client" M_s = H(A, M_c, K_c) global_print("M_s") # server->client (M_s) ; client verifies M_s Real world implementations * The Javascript Crypto Library includes a Javascript implementation of the SRP protocol, open source, AGPL licensed. Used in Clipperz online password manager. * The Srp-Hermetic Library uses SRP as part of the process to establish a secure AJAX channel. Srp-Hermetic is released under the MIT open source license. * Gnu Crypto provide a Java implementation licensed under the GNU General Public License with the "library exception", which permits its use as a library in conjunction with non-Free software. * The Legion of the Bouncy Castle provide Java and C# implementations licensed under the MIT License. References External links Manual pages * * RFCs * RFC 2944 - Telnet Authentication: SRP * RFC 2945 - The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System * RFC 3720 - Internet Small Computer Systems Interface (iSCSI) * RFC 3723 - Securing Block Storage Protocols over IP * RFC 3669 - Guidelines for Working Groups on Intellectual Property Issues * RFC 5054 - Using the Secure Remote Password (SRP) Protocol for TLS Authentication Other links * Official site * SRP Protocol Design * IEEE 1363 * SRP Intellectual Property Slides Category:Cryptographic protocols Category:Asymmetric-key cryptosystems Category:Password authentication fr:Secure Remote Password pl:Secure Remote Password ru:SRP